Wealth Security Protocol
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Overview
💜Casa vs. Alternatives
Introduction
Option #1: Do-it-yourself
Option #2: Custodial Storage
Option #3: Commercial Systems
🔑System Design Principles
Introduction
Minimal Knowledge
High Security
Usability is Security
Expert Support
Redundancy
Sovereignty
Incentive Alignment
Bitcoin First
🚨Threat Overview
Introduction
Data and Credential Loss
Phishing
SIM Hijacking
Network Attacks
Malware
Supply Chain Attack
Physical Coercion
Child/Pet Attack
Internal Service Provider Attack
Platform / Hosting Provider Attack
Code Dependency Attack
Official Seizure
Inheritance Failure
🔐Chosen Features
Introduction
Hardware Wallet Signing
Multi-signature
Multi-location
Heterogeneous Hardware and Software
Seedless Hardware Wallets
Emergency Recovery Key
PIN or Biometrics for Mobile Key only
PIN for every device
Sovereign Recovery Instructions
Emergency Lockdown Button
Health Check
Identity Verification for Account Recovery
✅Chosen Key Schemes
3-of-5 Key Shield
2-of-3 Basic Multisig
Single-Key Wallet
❌Rejected Key Schemes
Key Sharding (Shamir’s Secret Sharing)
2-of-2
1-of-2
❌Rejected Features
Biometrics General Usage
Seed Phrase Backups
Financial Products and Services Integration
Brain Wallet -- Memory Based Solutions
Web-Based Key Management
Hardened Addresses
🔧Remaining Attack Vectors
Address Spoofing
Malicious Insider Key Theft
Extreme disaster scenarios
Extortion
👨‍🚀Future Improvements
Taproot/MAST
Schnorr Signatures
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Web-Based Key Management
A common way of distributing key management software and wallets is by embedding them in web pages. The user can simply navigate to a web page hosting a javascript application that allows them to generate a wallet, view their balances, get addresses, and/or sign transactions. To protect against potential malware, the user can download the page and use it offline on an air-gapped computer.
We decide against using web-based key management for several reasons.

Drawbacks:

  • Phishing - Due to the nature of hypertext, it is easier to direct someone to a fake web page than a fake app.
  • Browser Privacy - Many popular browser extensions have permission to read and alter every web page a user visits. When a user chooses to trust a web wallet, they are also choosing to trust every extension provider they are using with the security of their funds. Even if the keys are not present on the web page, a malicious extension could alter addresses, showing the user a receiving address that belongs to the attacker.
  • Complexity - To protect against malware, a web wallet should only be used on a dedicated single-purpose air-gapped computer. Due to the complexity of setting up an air-gapped system, many users will fail to do so, putting their funds at risk.
❌Rejected Features - Previous
Brain Wallet -- Memory Based Solutions
Next - ❌Rejected Features
Hardened Addresses
Last modified 2yr ago
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Contents
Drawbacks: