Wealth Security Protocol
Wealth Security Protocol
Go to Casa Home
Overview
💜Casa vs. Alternatives
Introduction
Option #1: Do-it-yourself
Option #2: Custodial Storage
Option #3: Commercial Systems
🔑System Design Principles
Introduction
Minimal Knowledge
High Security
Usability is Security
Expert Support
Redundancy
Sovereignty
Incentive Alignment
Bitcoin First
🚨Threat Overview
Introduction
Data and Credential Loss
Phishing
SIM Hijacking
Network Attacks
Malware
Supply Chain Attack
Physical Coercion
Child/Pet Attack
Internal Service Provider Attack
Platform / Hosting Provider Attack
Code Dependency Attack
Official Seizure
Inheritance Failure
🔐Chosen Features
Introduction
Hardware Wallet Signing
Multi-signature
Multi-location
Heterogeneous Hardware and Software
Seedless Hardware Wallets
Emergency Recovery Key
PIN or Biometrics for Mobile Key only
PIN for every device
Sovereign Recovery Instructions
Emergency Lockdown Button
Health Check
Identity Verification for Account Recovery
✅Chosen Key Schemes
3-of-5 Key Shield
2-of-3 Basic Multisig
Single-Key Wallet
❌Rejected Key Schemes
Key Sharding (Shamir’s Secret Sharing)
2-of-2
1-of-2
❌Rejected Features
Biometrics General Usage
Seed Phrase Backups
Financial Products and Services Integration
Brain Wallet -- Memory Based Solutions
Web-Based Key Management
Hardened Addresses
🔧Remaining Attack Vectors
Address Spoofing
Malicious Insider Key Theft
Extreme disaster scenarios
Extortion
👨‍🚀Future Improvements
Taproot/MAST
Schnorr Signatures
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Address Spoofing

While the Casa system is highly secure, the user still needs to obtain a destination address for each transaction from an exchange or wallet outside Casa’s systems. Malware on a user’s computer could theoretically cause their web browser or other communication software to display an incorrect address. This would defeat the security of any storage system, as it occurs outside of that system.

Mitigation:

  • Use of a mobile app mitigates browser extension based address modification.

  • We re-derive receiving addresses independently on both server and mobile device. The app will throw an error if there is a mismatch between server and mobile device.

  • Use of Casa’s Sovereign Recovery tool allows an external validation of addresses. We are working on improved methods for this secondary check.

❌Rejected Features - Previous
Hardened Addresses
Next - 🔧Remaining Attack Vectors
Malicious Insider Key Theft
Last updated 2 years ago